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The creation of a virulent mousepox virus
in Australia and publication of this exper-
iment in 2001 are often argued to mark
a dangerous turn in dual use research
(1). After this experiment and – far more
consequential – September 11 and the
anthrax letters, the oversight of dual use
research in the life sciences received con-
siderable attention in the United States. We
argue that the American experience pro-
vides valuable lessons for Australia, three
of which are highlighted here.
First, the international community is ill-
equipped to govern the life sciences. Like
the United States, Australia should there-
fore help itself through national regula-
tions and oversight. Second, like most spe-
cial interest groups, scientists prefer self-
regulation. While this may be a practical
solution for scientific publications, feder-
ally funded research warrants independent
review as a condition of funding. Third,
in order to provide independent review,
oversight should be truly multidisciplinary,
including social, political, and biological
expertise. A multidisciplinary approach
stands the best chance of balancing the risks
and rewards of dual use research.
THINK GLOBAL, ACT NATIONAL
The risks and rewards of dual use research
have global implications. Despite repeated
calls for international leadership, however,
the World Health Organization (WHO)
has followed rather than led member states,
and it is unlikely to adopt a more assertive
role. The WHO rarely issues advice on bio-
logical weapons (although it helps to mon-
itor some smallpox research), and it said
little about dual use until after the National
Academies in the United States published
the influential Fink Report confronting this
dilemma in 2004 (2). In 2010, the WHO
published its own anodyne guidance on
“responsible life sciences research,” which
acknowledges the “important role of WHO
to lead” but then concedes to a “country-
based approach”(3). Moreover, when faced
with experiments that increased the trans-
missibility of H5N1 influenza (4, 5), the
WHO sought to distance itself from any
suggestion that it might assume addi-
tional responsibilities for oversight, focus-
ing instead on “ad hoc solutions” to this
particular controversy (6). Simply put, the
WHO lacks the resources and will neces-
sary to govern research, so states must act
on their own.
Of course, the United States was never
waiting for the WHO. American guidance
and oversight of dual use research draws
on an older system devised for recom-
binant DNA research that dates back to
the Asilomar Conference in 1975. The
Fink Report, for instance, argued that “we
now need to build upon the Asilomar
experience” to manage the potential mis-
use of biotechnology (2). This report and
the National Science Advisory Board for
Biodefense (NSABB) that it inspired in
turn proposed incorporating oversight of
dual use research into the existing sys-
tem of review by Institutional Biosafety
Committees and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (7).
Though less explicit, similar logic is
implied in the 2012 “Policy for Oversight
of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Con-
cern” (8), as well as the 2013 “United States
Government Policy for Institutional Over-
sight” (9). As it now stands, U.S. policy will
address 7 types of experiments of concern
that were identified by the Fink Report,
along with 15 select agents that are regu-
lated through the 2001 PATRIOT Act and
the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. Oversight will
be accomplished through institutional and
federal review of dual use research that
is funded by the government, which, if
fully implemented, will probably resem-
ble the system used for recombinant DNA
research.
In Australia, at least two legislative
instruments apply to the dual use dilemma.
First, the National Health Security Act 2007
regulates biosafety and biosecurity stan-
dards for handling “security sensitive bio-
logical agents.” Second, the Defence Trade
Control Act 2012 applies to dual use tech-
nology, particularly through the Defence
and Strategic Goods List. Like the Ameri-
can Commerce Control List, the Australian
list designates various “materials, chemi-
cals, micro-organisms, and toxins” as being
dual use and subject to export control
(10). Responsibility for research oversight
in the life sciences was devolved to the
National Health and Medical Research
Council (NHMRC) in 2013. As “Aus-
tralia’s leading expert body promoting the
development and maintenance of public
and individual health standards” (11), the
NHMRC is now proposing a supplement
to the Australian Code for the Responsible
Conduct of Research regarding dual use or
“gain of function” research (12).
FOCUS ON FUNDING
Moving forward, Australia will need to
decide what steps it will take to actu-
ally oversee research of concern, and the
United States still has a long way to
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go in implementing its evolving policies.
The success of these national systems will
depend on the active participation and sup-
port of the scientific community, which
has special interests in how research is
governed. Yet, special interests can diverge
from the public interest, and this political
fact has important implications for where
oversight should occur and who should be
involved.
Where should oversight occur? Of all
the potential points of intervention, scien-
tific communications are probably the least
practical and most controversial to regu-
late, as illustrated by the H5N1 publishing
controversy. Granted, the pre-publication
review of these experiments could be con-
sidered a partial success, since they were
not simply published without first evaluat-
ing the risks (as was the case in the Aus-
tralian mousepox experiment and others).
It is debatable, however, how much this
review process affected the outcome. Plus,
the surrounding controversy suggests that
many scientists fear censorship more than
malicious use of their research. Insisting on
self-governed or unrestricted publications,
scientists are quick to cry foul over the U.S.
government encroaching on the norm of
scientific transparency or openness.
Adherence to this norm is easy to
overstate: scientists restrict information all
the time, from nuclear and trade secrets
to blind peer review. Nevertheless, it is
impractical for the United States or Aus-
tralia to restrict information that is often
disseminated in different forms and venues
throughout the course of research. It is far
better to focus on government funding.
Many life scientists depend on this fund-
ing, which gives the government significant
leverage. Requiring review as a condition of
funding also provides for early oversight.
This may shape the trajectory of research,
thereby increasing the potential benefits
while reducing the risks before there are
results to worry about publishing.
Tying funding to oversight is not a new
idea nor is it a complete solution. But shap-
ing research through federal funding is a
relatively efficient option for the United
States, especially since research of con-
cern represents a small fraction of dual
use research. For example, the NIH spends
nearly $30 billion each year on more than
50,000 projects. Of these, <800 involve
agents covered by the government’s new
policy, and review by the NIH “designated
10 extramural and no intramural projects
as dual use research of concern” (13).
While NIH is not the only relevant sponsor,
these numbers suggest that funding agen-
cies can oversee research of concern with-
out stigmatizing it or imposing an undue
burden.
Attaching oversight to federal funding
is potentially an even more efficient option
for Australia. Compared to the United
States, the Australian funding environment
is more government-driven and central-
ized, with relatively few private, philan-
thropic foundations, and a smaller ecosys-
tem of federal sponsors. As in the United
States, some research will escape oversight
tied to federal funding, but in Australia,
both the supply of commercial research
and total government support are smaller.
For example, while a large fraction of Aus-
tralian medical research is funded by the
NHMRC, its total budget is only about $1
billion per year. It is therefore feasible to
oversee research of concern through federal
funding in Australia.
Unfortunately, Australia appears poised
to forgo this promising option, attempting
instead to abdicate government responsi-
bility. That may be a reasonable response to
the publication problem, and the prospect
that it would become an offense to“publish
or otherwise disseminate” listed technol-
ogy under the Defence Trade Control Act
has prompted a proposed amendment to
narrow the prohibition on publication to
military goods (14). However, rather than
conduct any review of the research that it
funds, the NHMRC looks set to delegate
this responsibility to individual researchers
and their home institutions through the
Australian Code for the Responsible Con-
duct of Research. Institutions may estab-
lish review bodies to ensure that their
researchers’ activities and publications do
not breach the Code, but this overly decen-
tralized approach stands to be burden-
some to implement, difficult to enforce,
and it probably fails to address core ten-
sions between some research and the public
good.
Australia would be better served by
learning from the United States. This not
only means establishing an advisory board
like the NSABB but, perhaps more sig-
nificant, also focusing on federal over-
sight of federally funded research. The
risks – including the risk of agencies such
as NHMRC looking negligent in the event
of an accident or malicious use – are too
great to delegate or ignore.
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REVIEW
Finally, who should be involved with over-
sight? Independent review is easier said
than done. Again, scientists prefer self-
regulation and, when it comes to admis-
sible expertise, the boundaries they draw
around their profession often look strategic
and narrow. The H5N1 publishing contro-
versy demonstrates that even the NSABB
and WHO, which supposedly represent
a range of expertise, are vulnerable to
the accusation that their recommendations
suffer from conflicts of interest (15). Sim-
ilarly, the NIH and other funding agencies
risk losing public trust if their oversight sys-
tems are stacked with researchers from the
same fields that they review.
Dual use research is – by definition –
a social and political issue, so oversight
that lacks considerable social and politi-
cal expertise is suspicious. “Separating sci-
ence from politics is impossible in the
real world” (16), and a breadth of exper-
tise and perspective is critical for indepen-
dent review (17). So a multidisciplinary
approach to oversight is best. We would
include political science, given our profes-
sion, but not to the exclusion of fields rang-
ing from sociology and history to econom-
ics and medical anthropology. Although
NSABB has voting members with a back-
ground in law, for example, legal expertise
is no more a substitute for political science
than chemistry is for biology.
A multidisciplinary approach can also
provide valuable perspectives on how to
incorporate public participation into over-
sight. Some scientists bristle at the very
idea, consistent with their special inter-
est in self-regulation. But federal funding
is tax-payer money, and so it is not out-
landish to suggest that scientists should be
accountable for the resources they use. Fur-
thermore, it is hypocritical to tout the norm
of scientific transparency when opposing
restrictions on scientific publications and
then decry more open oversight in favor of
closed or cloistered peer review. A multi-
disciplinary approach to oversight is only
one step toward adjudicating the trade-
offs involved. Yet, it is a critical step, since
the positive and negative externalities of
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dual use research extend far beyond the
laboratory.
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